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Abstract
The global investment regime is a prime example of the so-called ‘politicization beyond the state.’ Investment agreements
with an Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism have become contested in several corners of the globe, trig-
gering a widespread reform process encompassing national, regional and multilateral levels. This article examines the
consequences of this confluence of politicization processes, focusing on the European Union (EU) and two key venues of
ISDS reform: the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).
Combining different strands of politicization literature in International Relations and Political Science, the article advances
a nuanced conceptualisation of the institutional consequences of politicization that goes beyond a deepening/decline
dichotomy. Instead, the article examines whether and how politicization generates ‘authority shifts,’ either through a ver-
tical move between international and national levels; and/or through a horizontal recalibration between public and private
forms of governance. The article argues that although the EU’s initiative for global ISDS reform intended to rebalance pub-
lic and private authority while strengthening its international character, the on-going reform processes at the UNCITRAL
and the ECT may eventually lead to a (partial) dismantling of international authority.
Keywords
authority; Energy Charter Treaty; European Union; global governance; investment; Investor–State Dispute Settlement;
politicization; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Politicization of EU Trade Policy across Time and Space” edited by Dirk De Bièvre (Univer-
sity of Antwerp, Belgium), Oriol Costa (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain/IBEI, Spain), Leif Johan Eliasson (East
Stroudsburg University, USA) and Patricia Garcia-Duran (University of Barcelona, Spain).
© 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Foreign investment is typically considered a key driver
of economic growth, job creation, development and
lasting peace. Consequently, governments and interna-
tional institutions regularly insist on the importance
of boosting investments through an open and rules-
based regime (G20, 2019, p. 2). However, at no other
time had investment governance raised so widespread
controversy as over the past decade. Several coun-
tries around the world have cancelled or withdrawn
from bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, and
mega-trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), derailed in big part due to disagree-
ments over investment provisions. The Investor–State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a standard mechanism in-
cluded in investment agreements allowing foreign com-
panies to bring claims against states in ad hoc arbitra-
tion tribunals, has become the object of popular out-
cry in many developing and developed countries alike.
In Europe,mobilization against investor–state arbitration
has beenparticularly high, to the point that the European
Union (EU) Trade Commissioner dubbed ISDS “the most
toxic acronym in Europe” (Cecilia Malmström, as cited in
Ames, 2015). The widespread contention regarding the
international investment regime is thus a prime exam-
ple of what International Relations and European inte-
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gration scholars have diagnosed as the politicization of
global and regional governance, understood as “grow-
ing public awareness of international institutions and in-
creased public mobilization of competing political pref-
erences regarding institutions’ policies or procedures”
(Zürn, Binder, & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012, p. 71).
The simultaneous politicization of ISDS in several
parts of the world and at different levels, from states’
investment protection policies, to bilateral and regional
agreements and global arbitration rules, raises the ques-
tion of what the consequences are of this confluence of
politicization processes? While there has been a grow-
ing scholarly interest in the patterns and drivers of the
politicization of ISDS (see below), the institutional con-
sequences of this surge in public and political mobi-
lization have been more scantly researched. Examining
the consequences of politicization is not straightforward,
given that contestation of ISDS has come from differ-
ent quarters. For example, ISDS has been resisted on
sovereigntist grounds, particularly in developing coun-
tries, which arguably signed investment agreements
with investor–state arbitration without being fully aware
of their consequences (Poulsen & Aisbett, 2013). ISDS
has also been criticised as a quintessential illustration
of neoliberal economic discipline. This is the case of
the early scholarly criticism of ISDS as an example of
‘new economic constitutionalism’ or ‘lex mercatoria,’
to denounce the privatization of authority in interna-
tional public law (Cutler, 1995; Schneiderman, 2008;
Van Harten, 2005). Relatedly, civil society organisations
have increasingly branded their opposition campaigns
in terms of democracy and justice, encapsulated in the
moto ‘right to regulate’ to improve social and environ-
mental protection (Siles-Brügge, 2017). Less sympathet-
ically, mobilisation against international courts, includ-
ing arbitration tribunals, is also seen as part of the pop-
ulist backlash to globalisation (Voeten, 2019). Therefore,
ISDS constitutes a suitable empirical case where to ex-
amine the effects of complex and multilevel politiciza-
tion processes.
Focusing on the consequences of politicization is
also analytically relevant, given that the emerging lit-
erature on this phenomenon has also tended to focus
on its drivers (cf. Zürn, 2018, p. 159). In some of the
most comprehensive theorizations, the consequences of
politicization are defined in terms of institutional deep-
ening/decline (Zürn, 2018, pp. 13–14) or integration/re-
nationalisation (de Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016,
pp. 12–13). While taking these approaches as a point
of departure, this article suggests a more nuanced way
to assess the consequences of politicization, focusing
on whether it leads to actual ‘authority shifts.’ To that
aim, it brings different strands of politicization literature
in International Relations and Political Science closer to-
gether, by examining whether widespread societal con-
testation of international institutions leads to a vertical
displacement of authority between international and na-
tional levels; and/or a horizontal recalibration between
public and private forms of governance. It is argued
here that such a conceptualisation can offer a more fine-
grained diagnosis of global governance changes without
prejudging their normative implications.
This conceptualisation of the consequences of politi-
cization is applied to the study of three crucial venues
of ISDS reform: the EU—the world’s largest source of
foreign investment; the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)—the UN body pro-
viding one of the most widely applied arbitral rules; and
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)—the world’s most liti-
gated international treaty. In all these settings, crucial ac-
tors have expressed their commitment to ISDS reform as
a response to the domestic and/or transitional mobilisa-
tion. However, given the different degrees and sources of
politicization of ISDS across venues, we can also expect
different demands for authority recalibration across insti-
tutions, from their mere fine-tuning to full dismantling.
The study of this variation can therefore enrich the dis-
cussion on when and how politicization translates into
international institutional change.
The argument unfolds in six sections. The first one
outlines the conceptual and theoretical discussion. The
second presents a brief background on the origins and
patterns of politicization of ISDS. The following three
sections examine the reform processes in the EU, the
UNCITRAL and the ECT. The analysis is based on the offi-
cial proposals, country submissions and debates on ISDS
reform in the three venues, mostly between 2016 and
2019 and using different techniques of qualitative con-
tent analysis. The last section concludes, summarizing
the findings and discussing the implications of the politi-
cization of ISDS for the future shape of investment gov-
ernance and beyond.
2. Consequences of Politicization beyond the State:
Tracing Authority Shifts
Compared to the abundant literature examining the pat-
terns and drivers of politicization, particularly in the EU
(cf. Kauppi & Wiesner, 2018), the study of its conse-
quences is a less well-chartered research territory. The
discussion on the consequences of politicization has ad-
dressed two main questions, one empirical and one nor-
mative. Empirically, the main question is whether politi-
cization contributes to boost or hinder regional integra-
tion and global governance. The answer has so far been
rather inconclusive. On the one hand, in the context
of the EU, politicization is often identified as the miss-
ing link for a well-functioning polity, and hence a pre-
condition for further integration (for a debate, see Hix
& Bartolini, 2006). On the other, the so-called end of the
‘permissive consensus’ in both European integration and
multilateral institutions may also multiply resistance to
cooperation beyond the state (Hooghe & Marks, 2009;
Zürn et al., 2012, p. 99). On the normative dimension,
there is also no agreement onwhether politicization rein-
forces or weakens democracy.While politicization can be
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a democracy-enhancing process, given that it fosters par-
ticipation and parliamentary involvement (Zürn, 2014,
p. 59), it can also deepen the sense of legitimacy crisis
or sometimes even work against stronger parliamentary
control (de Wilde et al., 2016, p. 14; Herranz-Surrallés,
2019, p. 32).
The theory of global governance advanced by
Michael Zürn (2018) tries to close the politicization loop
by examining its causes, possible consequences, as well
as empirical and normative implications. Themodel iden-
tifies the delegation of authority and the related le-
gitimacy problems as the driving forces for politiciza-
tion. In other words, institutions that gain authority are
more likely to suffer from legitimacy problems, since
their procedures and performance will become more
strictly scrutinised and subject to higher expectations
(Tallberg & Zürn, 2019, p. 12; Zürn, 2018, p. 98). The
model then assigns a central role to the responses within
those institutions as the key determinant for the conse-
quences of politicization: Depending on how the legiti-
macy gap is dealt with by the authority holders, politi-
cization will lead to institutional deepening or decline
(Zürn, 2018, pp. 13–14, 143–144). While this model has
motivated highly interesting research on the institutional
responses to politicization (see, e.g., contributions dis-
cussed in Tallberg & Zürn, 2019), it comes also with an-
alytical drawbacks.
On the empirical dimension (the impact of politiciza-
tion on the extent of global governance), conceptualising
the effects of politicization in dichotomist terms (deepen-
ing or decline) does not allow for grasping the nuances
of international reform processes. It is also unclear what
happens to the authority of international institutions,
whichwas at the origin of the politicization process. To be
sure, institutional deepening and decline might be inter-
preted, respectively, as an increase or a roll-back of au-
thority of international institutions, measured in terms
of their formal or informal powers. Yet, this still comes
with the limitation that it implicitly focuses only on ver-
tical authority moves (delegation from states to interna-
tional institutions and back), neglecting another impor-
tant dynamic of delegation of authority that is central
to the debates on (de)politicization in Political Science.
In this strand of literature, politicization is defined in
terms of ‘arena shifts’ or how issues migrate from the
private to the public/governmental spheres (politiciza-
tion) and vice-versa (depoliticization) (Flinders & Buller,
2006; Hay, 2007). This dimension of politicization is thus
also concerned with horizontal transfers of authority be-
tween public and private actors. In this literature, the
horizontal delegation of authority is also at the roots of
politicization. The argument is that politicization can be
the reaction to long periods of depoliticization, under-
stood as the displacement of decision-making authority
from elected representatives to private actors and non-
majoritarian institutions. In the words of Flinders and
Wood (2015, p. 379), “attempts at depoliticizationwill, al-
most inevitably, come back to haunt the politicians who
enact them in the hope of ending political contestation
once and for all.” Therefore, given that many areas of
international governance also imply depoliticization via
delegation to private actors and independent expert bod-
ies, it is important to consider both the vertical and hor-
izontal dimensions in which authority can become con-
tested and recalibrated.
On the normative dimension (the impact of politiciza-
tion on the democratic quality of global governance), the
deepening/decline approach somehow conflates the in-
stitutional effects of politicization with their success or
failure in addressing the legitimacy gaps. In that regard,
deepening is conceptualised as the result of success-
ful re-legitimation through substantive reforms, whereas
decline is the result of an enduring legitimacy gap due
to the lack (or symbolic character) of reforms (Zürn,
2018, p. 168; see also Dietz, Dotzauer, & Cohen, 2019,
pp. 751–755). This link is problematic, first, in empirical
terms, since sometimes the re-legitimation of an interna-
tional institution might come precisely from a downscal-
ing of its authority. In that sense, re-legitimation does
not always imply the deepening of global governance.
Secondly, conflating institutional change with its legiti-
mation also presents some analytical challenges, as it
forces the analyst to take a stance on whether the re-
forms undertaken by the institution are symbolic or sub-
stantial, something that is difficult to objectify and is part
of the politicization game itself. Finally, and more norma-
tively, the terms deepening/decline risk being too value-
loaded, in the sense that the former appears positively
related to a well-functioning global governance and the
latter echoes more negative processes such as populist
backlash or de-globalisation. Therefore, the suggestion
advanced here is to analytically separate the institutional
consequences of politicization (i.e., the tracing of author-
ity shifts) from the assessment of the perceptions and
normative consequences of those shifts for the legiti-
macy of global governance.
In sum, while taking authority and legitimacy gaps
as a point of departure, the approach advanced in
this article proposes: (i) a more nuanced and value-
neutral conceptualisation of the institutional conse-
quences of politicization (authority shifts rather than de-
cline/deepening); and (ii) the analytical separation of
these institutional consequences from their social legit-
imacy (rather than premising deepening/decline on the
success of legitimation).
Since the focus of this article is on the institutional
consequences of politicization, the analysis that follows
offers only a succinct introduction to the drivers and
patterns of politicization of ISDS, relying mostly on sec-
ondary literature. The subsequent analysis focuses on ex-
amining the institutional responses in the three selected
cases (EU, UNCITRAL and ECT). Through qualitative con-
tent analysis of official documents, the article traces
the proposed recalibrations of authority along the na-
tional/international and public/private continuums. The
analysis is presented in a qualitative form, giving argu-
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ments and quotes to illustrate the proposed authority
shifts. Finally, given the different stages of ISDS reforms,
a full assessment of the degree to which the authority
shifts lead to higher political and public acceptability is
only feasible to a limited extent in the scope of this ar-
ticle. Yet, the analysis takes the responses by political
elites, civil society and commentators as a ‘first cut’ in-
dication of the possibility of authority shifts to close the
legitimacy gap in global investment governance.
3. The Politicization of ISDS: Authority Delegation and
Its Backlash
The origins of modern treaty-based ISDS date back to the
decolonization period, in a context where the national-
ization of assets by host states often escalated into diplo-
matic and military crises (the so-called ‘gunboat diplo-
macy’). In that sense, the creation of ISDS has often been
described as a well-intended mechanism to depoliticize
investment disputes. For example, studies on the estab-
lishment of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1966 recount how the
drafters in the World Bank were driven by the idea of
transferring investment conflicts from the political arena
of diplomatic protection to judicial remedy (Kriebaum,
2018, p. 14). Similarly, St. John (2018, p. 66) describes
how the World Bank’s experience with failed mediation
in politically-charged disputes during the decolonization
period provided the breeding ground in which the Bank
decided to advocate for a new dispute settlement ma-
chinery. Following the 1966 ICSID convention, the idea of
investor–state arbitration was gradually inserted in the
dense network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that
proliferated particularly since the 1990s. Accordingly, dis-
putes were entrusted to ad hoc tribunals, operating un-
der commonly agreed arbitral rules such as that of the
ICSID or the UNCITRAL’s. Therefore, ISDS implied a simul-
taneous transfer of state authority upwards and later-
ally, given that resolution of disputes was delegated to
hybrid bodies: international private tribunals with a pub-
lic function.
However, since the early 2000s, the system started to
show signs of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Franck, 2005), which
reached its full extent in terms of public salience in
the mid-2010s (Langford & Behn, 2018, pp. 554–558).
Criticism towards ISDS has ranged from principled con-
cerns against conferring foreign companies with special
rights to bring claims against states and the implications
of this for national sovereignty, democracy and public
policy, to a wide array of procedural concerns. These in-
clude, among others, the lack of transparency, doubts re-
garding the neutrality of arbitrators, their lack of diver-
sity and expertise in international public law, the ad hoc
nature of the tribunals, leading to high discretion and
inconsistencies, the lack of appeal mechanisms, or the
ample possibilities for companies to abuse the system
(cf. UNCITRAL, 2018). Therefore, the evolution of ISDS il-
lustrates well the argument by Flinders andWood (2015)
that depoliticization efforts via the insulation of sensi-
tive issues formmajoritarian institutionsmight sooner or
later come back to haunt the decision-makers.
In line with the authority hypothesis discussed in
the previous section, the rise in public attention partic-
ularly since the early 2010s coincided with the surge
in ISDS court cases—in 2011 the number of yearly new
claims climbed from 35 to above 50 and oscillated be-
tween 50 and 80 since then until 2018 (see Figure 1).
Moreover, this increase affected developed countries as
much as developing ones—between 2013 and 2015, the
share of cases where OECD countries were respondent
states was close to 50%. Highly controversial ISDS court
cases also served as powerful illustrations of the author-
ity gained by the international arbitration system, its po-
tential abuse by companies and the high discretion of ar-
bitrators. Some of the most well-known cases in that re-
gard are the Philip Morris v. Uruguay (2010) and Philip
Morris v. Australia (2012) cases, which showcased the
potential encroachment of ISDS on the right of states
to regulate to the benefit of public health; similarly, the
high-profile Vattenfall v. Germany cases (2009, 2012) in
the framework of the ECT were also widely discussed as
examples where investment protection clashed with en-
vironmental and safety regulations.
Patterns of politicization have varied widely across
countries, depending not only on their experience with
ISDS litigation, but also political opportunity structures.
In some countries, societal opposition has been mostly
top-down, driven by political elites’ reaction to un-
favourable arbitration cases. For example, the decision
of the South African parliament in 2009 to start terminat-
ing BITs can be linked to the Piero Foresti v. South Africa
(2007). In this case, investors from Luxembourg and Italy
challenged South Africa’s petroleum and mining law on
the requirement of minimum ownership by “historically
disadvantaged persons” in mining companies (Mellersh,
2015). The ‘resistance’ to ISDS by countries such as
Brazil, India or Indonesia has also been mostly elite-
driven, related to sovereignty and developmental con-
cerns (Sornarajah, 2015, pp. 300–346). In Latin America,
high-profile cases, affecting mostly extractive industries,
in countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina or Venezuela,
prompted the mobilization of both civil society and left-
leaning governments (Calvert, 2018). In OECD countries,
the pattern of politicization was more clearly bottom-
up, through the mobilisation of NGOs (Bilaterals, 2013;
Eberhardt, Redlin, Olivet, & Lora, 2016) and the schol-
arly community (Boyd et al., 2016; Public Citizen, 2016).
Given their significance and scope, the negotiation of the
TTIP and the TPP provided an ideal window of opportu-
nity for anti-ISDSmobilisation, as widely discussed in the
literature (among others, Eliasson & Garcia-Duran Huet,
2018; Kay & Evans, 2018, pp. 139–162).
Despite the diversity in the origins and degree of
politicization, thewide-spread criticism of investor–state
arbitration led the UNCTAD to acknowledge already in
2014 that “the questions are not about whether to re-
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Figure 1. Evolution of arbitration cases by type of respondent state and treaty (1995–2019). Source: Own calculation from
UNCTAD Investment Hub and ECT dispute settlement database.
form the international investment regime but how to do
so” and that this was not a matter of a “change to one
aspect in a particular agreement but about the compre-
hensive reorientation” (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 128). The fol-
lowing sections examine the reform proposals discussed
in the EU, the UNCITRAL and the ECT, the direction and
extent to which they aim to rebalance or relocate author-
ity, as well as their initial reception by the wider public.
4. EU Approach to ISDS Reform: A Horizontal
Recalibration of International Authority
The EU’s change of approach to investor–state arbitra-
tion has been strongly marked by the unprecedented,
and largely unexpected, public opposition to ISDS that
surfaced during the TTIP negotiations (De Ville & Gheyle,
2019). Until then, the Commission had been a strong
defendant of investor–state arbitration (cf. European
Commission, 2013). However, in view of the mounting
opposition, including thousands of critical responses to a
public consultation by the European Commission on ISDS
in 2014, the EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström,
recognised that there was “a huge scepticism against the
ISDS instrument” and committed to develop newpropos-
als addressing those concerns (European Commission,
2015a). The first occasion to materialise this new ap-
proach was the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), where the EU and Canada proposed
a reformed ISDS that was labelled Investment Court
System (ICS; section F of the CETA agreement, European
Union, 2017; see also Council of the European Union,
2016). As discussed below, while the ICS keeps some of
the defining features of ISDS, it entails a significant hori-
zontal recalibration towards strengthening the public law
elements of investor–state arbitration.
One of the first examples of public–private recalibra-
tion concerns the appointment of the arbitrators. Instead
of the usual procedure, where the investors are involved
in selecting the arbitration panel on a case-by-case ba-
sis, the ICS introduced a system of permanent judges ap-
pointed by the parties to the agreement. The ICS also
envisaged a binding code of conduct for the judges, in-
cluding a sanctions mechanism, and the requirement
of judges to have expertise in ‘public’ international law.
A second group of reforms focused on the investors,
mainly provisions limiting their possibility to abuse arbi-
tration via, for example, parallel arbitration procedures
(so-called ‘forum shopping’) or the use of ‘mailbox com-
panies.’ The ICS also reviewed the distribution of the
costs of arbitration following the ‘loser pays principle,’
to discourage unfounded cases. Finally, a third group of
measures that bring ICS closer to a public system of jus-
tice concerns the interpretation and revision of invest-
ment provisions and arbitral decisions, the main change
being the introduction of an Appellate Tribunal, aimed
at ensuring correctness and consistency of the decisions.
Significantly also, the ICS includes the possibility that the
parties of the agreement issue binding interpretations
on investment provisions, even with respect to ongoing
cases. As argued by the Commission, “we have given gov-
ernments, not arbitrators, ultimate control over the inter-
pretation of the rules” (European Commission, 2015b).
In parallel to the CETA revision, the Commission also
started to develop the idea of a Multilateral Investment
Court (MIC), which would entail the multilateralization
of the ICS concept. The MIC proposal thus follows the
same idea of recalibrating public–private authority. In
a joint article presented at the 2017 World Economic
Forum, the European Commission and the Canadian gov-
ernment justified the MIC option arguing that the princi-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 336–347 340
ples of commercial arbitration that have dominated tra-
ditional ISDS were inadequate for matters that concern
public policies (European Commission & Government of
Canada, 2017, p. 2). Next to the horizontal authority shift,
from private to public, the MIC would also mean a ver-
tical move towards higher international authority, since
the current ad hoc and fragmented system of arbitration
would be replaced by a permanent and stand-alone in-
stitution, modelled on existing international courts, such
as the International Court of Justice or the International
Criminal Court. Another sign of high international author-
ity is the EU preference for excluding the requirement
of exhaustion of local remedies, meaning that the MIC
would not observe the principles of subsidiarity and non-
interference that are common in other systems of inter-
national justice (Puccio & Harte, 2017, p. 26).
Although the EU member states’ governments have
backed the Commission’s effort to advance the MIC con-
cept at the UNCITRAL (Council of the European Union,
2018), the reception among the wider political and pub-
lic spheres has been rather critical. NGOs and scholars
deemed reforms as superficial and not complying with
minimumnormative standards of legitimacy (among oth-
ers, Diependaele, De Ville, & Sterckx, 2019; Dietz et al.,
2019; Eberhardt, 2016). Even more tellingly, support
among political representatives also remains low. The
debates at the European Parliament offer a good test-
ing ground in that regard. As Figure 2 shows, the idea of
investor–state arbitration continues to elicit very limited
positive connotations, even after the discussion moved
to the new ICS/MIC proposals in 2016. Only the Socialists
(S&D) came to be more supportive of the idea as a “new
model of public arbitration” (Silva Pereira, as cited in
European Parliament, 2017). Moreover, as Figure 2 also
illustrates, concerns remained high on the crucial as-
pects that the MIC was meant to solve, namely fairness,
right to regulate, democracy or legitimacy. Particularly
remarkable is the fact that most groups raised concerns
regarding the importance of domestic courts, arguing in
favour of the exhaustion of local remedies or in many
cases, denying the need for an international arbitration
mechanism. This means that most European political
groups are pushing also for a recalibration of authority on
the vertical dimension, from international to national, in
line with the ideas of subsidiarity and non-interference.
5. UNCITRAL Debates on ISDS Reform: Between
Horizontal and Vertical Recalibration
In view of the widespread criticism of investor–state ar-
bitration and the growing number of countries revising
(or terminating) their investment agreements since the
early 2010s, the momentum built up for a global ISDS re-
form (Schill, 2018). However, the choice of venue for such
a reform was not uncontroversial. On the one hand, sev-
eral countries, among them the US, preferred a technical
reform process within the ICSID framework, the World
Bank investment arbitration centre. On the other, an-
other group of countries, including the EU, advocated
for UNCITRAL, which would give reforms a more politi-
cal character. The choice of UNCITRAL as well as the ne-
gotiation procedure are an indication of a generalised
sentiment in favour of a comprehensive reform. For ex-
ample, negotiations were entrusted to Working Group
III (not Working Group II on arbitration) and UNCITRAL’s
secretariat encouraged member states to send govern-
ment representatives instead of the common practice of
states delegating such negotiations to arbitration practi-
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tioners (Roberts, 2018, pp. 18–19). The negotiating man-
date was also very broad, signalling high political dis-
cretion: identifying problems of ISDS, assessing whether
problems require reform and, if so, propose reform op-
tions. Negotiations started in November 2017 and by
April 2019 they entered the last phase (discussion of re-
form options). However, given the different patterns of
politicization in different parts of the world, delegations
remained split regarding the reform options proposed
and the type of authority recalibration needed.
The first pattern that stands out by examining the
country submissions to UNCITRAL (see Figure 3) is the
limited support for the partial horizontal recalibration
proposed by the EU. The idea of a standing court, in line
with theMIC proposal, garnered very limited explicit sup-
port. The only country submission that explicitly backed
the idea was that of Ecuador, a country that terminated
all its BITs in 2017 in a context of high domestic opposi-
tion to ISDS.
The second pattern is the significant number of coun-
try submissions advocating for a more limited horizon-
tal move towards public authority. These country sub-
missions come mostly from countries where societal
politicization of ISDS was moderate. The joint contribu-
tion by Mexico, Japan, Peru, Chile and Israel exempli-
fies this position, by advancing a menu of solutions en-
compassing free-standing codes, sharing of best prac-
tices, reform of UNCITRAL rules or treaty-specific mea-
sures, rather than creation of new institutions. The idea
of a code of conduct for arbitrators, mentioned in the
contributions of China, Turkey, Costa Rica, Bahrain or
Thailand also fits this idea of a modest horizontal recal-
ibration. Noticeable is also the contribution by Bahrain,
which makes clear its opposition to a standing court and
any major reforms in the direction of a more publically-
controlled appointment of arbitrators, as this “would
undo one of the hallmarks of the existing ISDS regime,
which has so far been rather successful in depoliticiz-
ing the appointment process” (United Nations General
Assembly, 2019a). Similarly, while supporting a mod-
est horizontal move with the creation of an Appellate
Mechanism, China and Russia also argued in favour of re-
taining the principle that arbitrators should be appointed
by the disputing parties. Therefore, both countries ar-
gued explicitly against a standing mechanism with per-
manent judges.
Appellate
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CN, EU, MA, RU
Standing Court
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EU, EC
Code of
conduct for
arbitrators
CN, TR, CR, BH,
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on Internaonal
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Figure 3.Mapping of the reform proposals submitted to UNCITRAL. Source: Own elaboration from the party submissions
to the 39th session of the UNCITRAL working group III (20–24 January 2020; UNCITRAL, 2020). All countries submitting a
position appear in the table but their reform options are not exhaustive (Figure 3 includes a selection of the main ideas ad-
vanced in the submissions). Country abbreviations follow UN/LOCODE codes: BH: Bahrain; BR: Brazil; CL: Chile; CN: China;
CO: Colombia; CR: Costa Rica; EC: Ecuador; EU: European Union; ID: Indonesia; IL: Israel; JP: Japan; KR: Republic of Korea;
MA: Morocco; ML: Mali; MX: Mexico; PE: Peru; RU: Russia; TH: Thailand; TR: Turkey; ZA: South Africa.
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The third trend is that of countries advocating a
more radical horizontal move towards public authority
and/or a vertical displacement towards the national level.
This group corresponds mostly to the countries where
politicization has been largely elite-driven, such as South
Africa, Brazil or Indonesia, and which had already opted
for alternative models to ISDS in their investment agree-
ments. Proposals entailing a vertical recalibration in-
clude the development of Alternative Dispute Resolution
mechanisms or the requirement of exhaustion of local
remedies. Further into the national direction, we find
ideas such as Joint Committees to interpret investment
law, involving state representatives or a shift to state-to-
state dispute settlement, as advanced by Brazil. South
Africa was the country advocating a more drastic verti-
cal relocation of authority, considering that any form of
investor–state arbitration “brings the public interest and
the people’s rights into the arena of private law” (United
Nations General Assembly, 2019b). According to South
Africa, companies should have their own risk manage-
ment mechanisms. At the most, in case ISDS would con-
tinue to exist, South Africa proposed to balance it with
other international instruments, such as a ‘supremacy
clause’ that would guarantee the precedence of human
rights and environmental treaties in case of clash with
investment protection provisions.
The analysis is certainly not exhaustive, as it exam-
ines only the formal country submissions. Other coun-
tries, while not submitting proposals, have also been ac-
tive in UNCITRAL negotiations. For example, the US has
sided mostly with the second group, arguing that there
is enough scope for countries to reform their investment
treaties within the current ISDS regime. This is the ap-
proach followed by the government of Donald Trump,
most notably with a significant limitation of the geo-
graphical and substantive scope of ISDS within the new
US–Mexico–Canada Agreement. While politicization of
ISDS in the US has remained high, the government’s op-
position to far-reaching ISDS reform at a global level
can be explained by the fact that anti-ISDS positions
have growingly focused on national sovereignty consider-
ations (Phillips, 2019). This domestic politicization struc-
ture is therefore a strong deterrent to support the idea
of a permanent court, as proposed by the EU, where con-
trary to the US, anti-ISDS mobilization focused mostly on
justice frames (Siles-Brügge, 2017).
Given the multi-national setting and variety of politi-
cization paths, assessing the social legitimacy of the re-
forms under discussion is a risky endeavour. What is no-
ticeable, however, is that the most active civil society
organisations following UNCITRAL’s negotiations have
sided with the third group, namely those advocating the
full dismantling of investor–state arbitration (e.g., Centre
for Research on Multinational Corporations, 2018). This
contrasts with the most likely path of ISDS reform at the
global level, namely a modest and gradual horizontal re-
balancing of authority.
6. ECT Reform Options: Towards Dismantling
International Authority?
Despite being the world’s most litigated international
treaty, with around 125 court cases, the ECT has re-
mained notoriously under the public radar. Contestation
of the ECT is certainly not new—e.g., Russia aban-
doned the regime in 2009 following the high-profile
Yukos v. Russia (2005) case—but, until recently, it was
not explicitly targeted by anti-ISDS campaigns. One of
the reasons for this might be that most of the ECT ar-
bitration cases since 2013 were filed by renewable en-
ergy companies against governments that unexpectedly
cut their support schemes for solar and wind energy.
Therefore, those cases did not fit well the anti-ISDS narra-
tive that arbitration empowers bigmultinationals to chal-
lenge environmental regulations. However, the politiciza-
tion of ISDS eventually also reached the ECT and civil so-
ciety organisations recently targeted it as “the world’s
most dangerous investment treaty” (Corporate Europe
Observatory, 2018). Building on the growing societal mo-
bilization on climate change issues, the ECT has also
been growingly targeted as a treaty that protects fossil-
fuel industries (Keay-Bright &Defilla, 2019). Recent cases
such as the Rockhopper v. Italy (2017), whereby the
UK-based gas and oil company sued Italy for the with-
drawal of a drilling concession in the Adriatic Sea, have
served as powerful illustrations in that regard (Corporate
Europe Observatory, 2018, p. 14). In this context, the ECT
launched a modernisation process in late 2018 tackling
ISDS. However, the more limited public salience of the
ECT, as compared to debates on ISDS in the context of
the TTIP, has led the reform process to be more driven
by the parties’ political preferences than by wider soci-
etal concerns.
The country submissions to the ECT Secretariat, in-
cluding responses from the EU and eight other con-
tracting parties (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2019), indi-
cate a general preference for a horizontal shift towards
more public authority. However, although most parties
strongly supported the inclusion of specific provisions to
safeguard governments’ ‘right to regulate,’ they referred
to it in different ways. On the one hand, the EU empha-
sized public goods and the inclusion of other interna-
tional rights and obligations, such as the protection of
climate change, sustainable development goals or corpo-
rate social responsibility. The most specific proposal in
that sense was suggested by Luxembourg, with the intro-
duction of a non-stabilisation clause, which would pre-
vent companies from challenging regulatory measures
aimed at facilitating the energy transition and the fulfil-
ment of the Paris Agreement (Energy Charter Secretariat,
2019, p. 16). On the other hand, when referring to
the right of states to regulate, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Albania emphasized the protection of sovereignty in a
more classical sense, namely the principle of ‘sovereignty
over energy resources’ or the possibility to exclude cer-
tain types of assets from ISDS upon considerations of
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‘essential security.’ Therefore, in this second sense, the
recalibration would also include a vertical dimension,
namely the strengthening of national authority in deter-
mining when ISDS applies.
At the same time, the ECT reform process has also
exposed the EU’s interest in a vertical recalibration of
authority, from the international to the EU level, for
reasons apparently unrelated to the societal politiciza-
tion of ISDS. Since the Lisbon Treaty’s extension of the
EU trade competence to foreign direct investment, the
Commission has strived for eliminating intra-EU invest-
ment treaties, which imply that EU companies can bring
claims against EU member states in international arbitra-
tion courts, thus bypassing the Court of Justice of the
EU (CJEU). The CJEU judgment in the Slovak Republic v.
Achmea B.V. (2018) supported the Commission’s view
that international arbitral courts have no jurisdiction in
intra-EU disputes. A more complex discussion has been,
therefore, whether the ban of intra-EU BITs also extends
to the ECT cases. More broadly, the Commission has long
feared that the ECT could eventually be used by both
European and non-European companies to challenge EU
regulatory measures affecting their business, for exam-
ple EU anti-state aid or unbundling requirements. The
unprecedented arbitration case against the EU, filed in
October 2019 by the Russian-owned Nord Stream 2 com-
pany, materialized these fears. Therefore, the EU’s grow-
ingly ambitious demands for the ECT reform are also led
by an attempt to vertically recalibrate international au-
thority to reassure the primacy of EU law.
In sum, the reform process in the ECT brings yet
another dimension to the discussion on the effects of
politicization. While the start of the latest reform pro-
cess was prompted by the wider politicization of ISDS in
the EU, other legal and (geo)political concerns are also
strongly influencing reform discussions. In view of the le-
gal imbroglio over the intra-EU BITs and concerns with
overlapping legal systems, some commentators have ar-
gued that, rather than reforming the ECT, the EU might
eventually advocate for its withdrawal (Simon, 2019),
whichwouldmean a virtual dismantling of the ECT. Quite
paradoxically, therefore, the disempowering of the ECT
could be one of the main successes for anti-ISDS groups
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2018) even if this is the
venue where reforms seem least determined by societal
mobilization concerns.
7. Conclusion
The changes underway in the governance of foreign in-
vestment are a clear illustration that “the politicization
of international institutions is a consequential develop-
ment” (Zürn, 2014, p. 157). Due to public and political
mobilization against ISDS in several parts of the world,
the international investment regime is undergoing far-
reaching reforms which might lead to a significant recal-
ibration or even relocation of authority. With a focus on
‘authority shifts’ in inter-linked arenas of ISDS reform this
article has sought to contribute to politicization litera-
ture in three ways.
First, in an attempt to better grasp the extent and
quality of institutional changes beyond deepening and
decline, this article advanced the idea of tracing author-
ity shifts both on vertical (national/international) and
horizontal (public–private) dimensions. The picture that
emerges from the analysis of authority shifts is a nu-
anced one, showing that while most states agree on the
need for reforming investor–state arbitration, there are
still competing options of authority recalibration. While
the EU has been one of the key supporters of a horizon-
tal recalibration of ISDS, from private to public author-
ity without altering (or even reasserting) its international
character, the reform process in other settings goes in
different directions. At theUNCITRAL, reformoptions are
polarised between those actors that pursue a very mod-
est horizontal recalibration and those who aspire to a
significant dismantling of international authority. At the
ECT, it is precisely the EU that seems to be pressing for
a vertical recalibration of authority due to concerns over
the autonomy and primacy of its legal system, a move
that could eventually mean the disempowerment of an
institution it helped create. The study of horizontal au-
thority shifts would also be relevant formany other areas
of global governance characterised by dis-embedding
and re-embedding struggles betweenmarket and society
(Scholte, 2016, p. 721), such as trade, finances, labour
standards or climate change; as well as by public–private
forms of regulation, from sustainable forestry to war di-
amonds (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002, pp. 125).
Secondly, the analysis suggests that politicization of
global affairs cannot be fully understood by looking only
at certain countries or institutions in isolation. In a glob-
alized world, different processes of politicization can in-
tersect and become an important factor mediating the
consequences of politicization. For example, the EU’s
new approach to investor–state arbitration in its bilat-
eral agreements and the MIC proposal was only possi-
ble thanks to parallel politicization dynamics in other in-
ternational arenas. There is also some ‘contagion effect’
of politicization, as shown by the ECT, initially very re-
sistant to politicization due to its sectoral nature, but
finally pulled into the wider reform process. In that
sense, international and domestic politicization patterns
can reinforce each other (cf. Costa, 2019). This inter-
section, however, also means that establishing a direct
causal link between politicization and the substance of
reforms in international institution is a difficult undertak-
ing, given the different degrees and drivers of politiciza-
tion in different countries (as shown by the UNCITRAL
case) and the impact of other intervening factors (as the
ECT case illustrated).
Finally, one of the added values of the proposed ap-
proach is also the decoupling of the empirical analysis
of the institutional consequences of politicization from
its normative assessment. In the ISDS case, politicization
might affect the global regime in a seemingly contradic-
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tory way. On the one hand, the multilateral regime will
most probably experience a gradual evolution,with some
horizontal recalibration in favour of greater public author-
ity. On the other, it will continue leaving states the flexibil-
ity to choose howmuch to empower or constrain interna-
tional arbitration through their investment agreements.
While this might lead to an overall downsizing in the in-
ternational authority of the investment regime (as the
drop of arbitration cases in 2019 seems to indicate), it
might also be the most viable path for its re-legitimation.
Therefore, and more broadly, rather than thinking of in-
ternational institutions in terms of deepening or decline,
this article invites a reflection on which horizontal and
vertical recalibrations of authority can ensure the legiti-
macy and sustainability of global governance.
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